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Many developing nations, especially the least developed countries, are subjected to 
recurrent spells of food insecurity. In order to understand food insecurity in these 
countries it is necessary to consider not only immediate or trigger-causes of food crises, 
but also its underlying or systemic causes. This paper argues that the agricultural 
support measures of advanced countries may act as a systemic cause for food insecurity 
in developing countries. While the import of subsidized foods by developing countries 
and/or the provision of food aid by developed countries are frequently necessary options 
to address food crises in the short run, they can adversely affect the economic 
development in the long run. Access to cheap foods can undermine agricultural 
production and contribute to the recurrence of food shortages. This paper examines 
these developments and makes proposals to address them. 
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‘There were 815 million people hungry in the developing world in 2002—nine million 
less than in 1990. Yet in the worst-affected regions—Sub-Saharan Africa and Southern 
Asia—the number of hungry people has increased by tens of millions’ (UN 2005: 8; 
similar Pingali and Stringer 2003; FAO 2004). Undernourishment and malnutrition 
continue to cause premature death and to impede the ability of humans to live up to their 
potentials and make full use of their capabilities (Sen 1999; Nussbaum 1993). The 
challenge to ensure appropriate nutrition and combat hunger is both a core objective of 
development and an indispensable prerequisite for it (Benson 2004).  
To combat food insecurity and ensure a sufficient food supply is both a moral 
imperative and an economic necessity. Given the importance of food security, it may be 
argued that food is a strategic good and that the supply of food should not be left to 
market forces, but should rather be ensured by the public sector.1 In countries that do 
not have the appropriate mix of and/or the appropriate endowments with factors of 
production, the decision to attain food self-sufficiency would necessitate relatively far-
reaching market interventions. While there may be sound political reasons why 
countries should attempt to ensure food self-sufficiency, there are compelling economic 
reasons for why countries should specialize according to their comparative advantage. 
One’s principle position on this issue will influence one’s approach to assess it; the 
guiding questions, the analysis itself and the conclusions. Without judging whether the 
political reason or the economic reason is more powerful, this paper assumes an 
economic rather than a political approach to the challenge of food security. Thus, it 
treats food like any other product and assumes that food security can potentially be 
ensured through market mechanisms.  
This paper focuses on the world’s poorest countries, namely the least developed 
countries (LDCs).2 Almost all of these countries are located in the regions that are most 
affected by food insecurity, namely Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. The LDCs are 
strongly affected by food insecurity, but the LDCs are also characterized by a 
generalized level of extreme poverty.3 According to poverty estimates based on national 
accounts the LDCs are already the major locus of extreme poverty in the world, but 
even according to poverty estimates based on household surveys, the LDCs are 
estimated to suffer from an absolute increase of extreme poverty in the coming years. 
By 2015, the target year for the reduction of extreme poverty by half, the LDCs will be, 
according to both types of poverty estimates, the major locus of extreme poverty in the 
world. At the turn of the millennium about 50 per cent of the population in these 
countries were already living in extreme poverty (UNCTAD 2002). Extreme poverty 
                                                 
1   If food is treated as a strategic product, what about water, clothing, medicine or oil? Could the same 
argument not be made for all these products? 
2   The LDCs are a group of developing countries that the United Nations has identified as least 
developed, owing to low income per capita, weak human resources and fragile economies. At present 
the group of LDCs includes a total of 50 developing economies.  
3   In accordance with international standards, extreme poverty is measured by a poverty line of one 
dollar per person per day in 1985 PPP.   
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and food insecurity are closely related, as the very poor are least able to take precautions 
against food insecurity and are therefore the first to be confronted by it. The FAO, 
which collects data for about 227 countries,4 has recorded 61 developing countries that 
experienced an acute food crisis during the seven-year period of 1998-2004 (see 
Table 1). The LDCs were affected more often than other developing countries: of the 61 
countries facing food crises 29 were LDCs, and 11 of these had suffered from food 
crises each year over the seven-year period. Of the other 32 countries only four 
experienced acute food crises each year over the corresponding period. 
While acknowledging that food crises in LDCs have many potential causes, this paper 
argues that food dilemma in the LDCs is closely related to distortions of the global 
agricultural markets, which can be attributed to agricultural support policies of 
advanced countries. Agricultural support measures as defined here include both 
subsidies and border measures; advanced countries include OECD countries but also 
advanced non-OECD countries. It is important to extend the analysis beyond OECD 
countries, as several advanced non-OECD countries also provide considerable support 
to domestic agriculture. 
The paper has four sections. The second section examines the patterns of agricultural 
specialization and food insecurity, and the third section assesses effects of agricultural 
support measures on food insecurity. In this context, the paper distinguishes between a 
trade-centric approach and a development-oriented approach to evaluate agricultural 
support measures. The fourth section concludes the analysis with a series of policy 
implications. 
2  Agricultural specialization and food crises 
Table 1 shows the LDCs’ specialization in the agricultural sector and their exposure to 
food crises, giving, where possible, individual values for the LDCs and for different 
developing-country groups. The developing countries are divided into three subgroups: 
namely low-income countries (World Bank definition), low-income, food-deficit 
countries (FAO definition), and the LDCs (UN definition). These three subgroups have 
overlapping memberships. 
2.1  Pattern of agricultural specialization 
Data on agriculture value added as share of GDP were collected for 171 countries. In 95 
countries the share of agriculture value added in their GDP exceeds the corresponding 
average of the developing-country group as a whole. Out of these 95 countries the share 
of agriculture population exceeds the corresponding average for the developing-country 
group in 45 nations; and out of these 45 countries the share of agricultural land area 
exceeds the corresponding average for the developing-country group in 24. 
 
                                                 
4   The term ‘countries’ as used here includes other territories. The use of this term is not intended to 
question the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or its authorities, or its frontiers or 
boundaries.   
 
Table 1 
Agriculture and food security indicators for LDCs and selected developing-country groups, 1998-2002 




% of GDP 
Population 
as  
% of total 
Land  




















food crises* Reasons for acute food crises 
Developing countries  11.3  52.0  40.7   -1958.6  -0.4  2651.3   1.6  0.2     
LDCs 29.0  70.0  36.2    -3631.8 -5.4  2111.5   5.3 0.5     
LICs 20.3  55.2  41.4    1542.0 0.6  2390.0   2.6  0.3     
LICs, food-deficit   19.0  57.4  44.3  3229.6  0.8  2595.5   1.9  0.2     
Afghanistan 54.1  67.0  58.4    -97.6  -4.5  –    10.7  1.3  8.0  Civil strife, drought, war 
Angola 8.2  71.9  46.0    -287.4  -23.0  2008.5   14.8  2.6  8.0  Civil strife, IDPs , returnees 
Bangladesh 24.8  55.7  62.7    -812.6 -5.9  2168.1   5.3 0.0  3.0  Floods 
Benin 36.8  54.0  28.4    -98.9  -16.0  2507.5   –  –     
Bhutan 35.9  93.7  12.1    -3.7  -1.8  –    –  –     
Burkina Faso  33.8  92.3  36.9    -98.0  -8.3  2393.8   2.3  0.5     
Burundi  51.3 90.4 80.9   23.2  3.8 1638.2   4.1  1.0  8.0  Civil strife, insecurity, IDPs, returnees 
Cambodia 41.0  70.1  29.3    -77.8  -5.9 1998.0   2.1  0.3  2.0 Floods 
Cape Verde  11.6  23.0  17.4    -58.6  -134.6 3193.8   107.7  2.7  2.0 Drought 
Central African Rep.  54.9  72.7  8.3    -9.9  -2.7  1967.3   1.1  0.2  3.0  Civil strife, IDPs 
Chad 38.6  75.2  37.8    15.5  2.0  2121.9  2.0  0.1  1.0  Refugees 
Comoros 39.8  73.6  64.8    -12.3 -17.6 1750.4   7.2  0.0     
Congo, D. R. of  53.4  63.2  9.7    -157.3  -3.2  1658.4   0.7  0.2  8.0  Civil strife, IDPs 
Djibouti 3.8  78.5  56.1    -62.9 -94.5 2128.2   17.6  2.0     
Equatorial Guinea  11.8  70.5  11.9    -2.0  -4.2  –    1.4  0.6     
Eritrea 18.7  77.6  63.5    -45.2  -12.2  1538.4   46.2  4.6  8.0  Drought, IDPs, returnees 
Ethiopia 44.5  82.4  27.9    116.3  1.8  1792.5  12.8  0.4  8.0  Drought,  IDPs 
Gambia 31.2  79.0  61.5    -50.5 -38.7 2266.9   4.0  1.1     
Guinea 23.8  83.8  49.7    -95.6  -11.8  2342.8   3.0  0.7  4.0  IDPs and refugees 
Guinea-Bissau 60.1  82.8  44.7    31.9 23.0  2075.8   7.0 2.6  3.0  
Haiti 26.9  62.3  57.3    -268.2  -33.5  2064.5   16.1  2.1  7.0  Civil strife, drought, floods 
Kiribati 17.2  27.4  53.4    –  –  2854.9   –  –     
Lao PDR  42.1  76.5  7.7    -17.1  -3.2 2261.1   2.9  0.2  2.0  
Lesotho 17.3  39.2  76.8    -105.2  -59.2  2595.0   6.2  1.2  3.0  Adverse weather, drought 




Table 1 (con’t) 
Agriculture and food security indicators for LDCs and selected developing-country groups, 1998-2002 




% of GDP 
Population 
as  
% of total 
Land  






















crises*  Reasons for acute food crises 
Madagascar 30.1  74.2  46.9    61.5  3.7  2043.4  1.6  0.8  4.0  Drought,  cyclones 
Malawi  35.7 77.6 34.8   34.7  3.1 2144.9   5.6  0.3  2.0  Adverse weather, drought 
Maldives –  27.1  34.7    -65.0  -223.5  2514.1   11.0  –     
Mali 41.3  81.0  28.0    -30.8  -2.6  2213.3   0.4  0.1     
Mauritania 22.6  52.9  38.8    -139.0 -52.7 2757.7   12.4  1.5  3.0  Drought 
Mozambique 28.0  76.9  60.2    -148.3 -8.3  1998.9   7.8  0.6  2.0 Drought 
Myanmar 58.7  70.2  15.9    208.9 4.4  2855.7   –  0.0     
Nepal 40.5  93.0  33.3    -80.6  -3.5  2406.0   0.4  0.0     
Niger 40.3  87.7  13.0    -37.4  -3.5  2135.6   2.1  0.1     
Rwanda 42.1  90.8  64.9    -12.2  -1.7 1941.2   13.5  5.7  4.0  Drought 
Samoa 13.1  34.5  45.1    -18.4  -106.1  2821.5   –  –     
Sao Tome & Principe 20.5  64.2  53.5    -2.8  -18.4  2328.8   26.0  1.5     
Senegal 18.1  73.8  41.0    -361.4 -38.5 2270.4   2.1  0.5     
Sierra Leone  47.6  62.2  38.5    -110.8  -24.9  1940.4   9.5  2.8  8.0  Civil strife, IDPs, returnees 
Solomon Islands  –  73.2  4.0    -13.5  -30.6  2238.0   –  –     
Somalia –  71.2  69.1    12.8  1.4  –    3.1  0.4  8.0  Drought, civil strife 
Sudan 40.0  61.1  53.4    -164.3  -5.1  2284.6   4.7  0.8  8.0  Civil strife, drought 
Tanzania, U.R. of  44.8  78.2  42.3    70.7 2.0  3750.6   –  –  6.0 Drought,  refugees 
Timor-Leste 33.9  81.7  19.3    -31.7  -43.9 2702.4   10.3  1.9  1.0  Drought 
Togo 39.5  59.7  63.6    -13.2  -2.8  2307.0   0.8  0.0     
Tuvalu  –  36.0  –    – –  –    – –    
Uganda 37.2  79.0  50.9    135.1  5.9  2333.2   2.5  0.5  8.0  Civil strife, IDPs, drought in parts 
Vanuatu 15.8  36.7  13.3    -9.1 -46.2 2559.0   0.1  0.0     
Yemen 16.3  50.4  33.6    -600.1  -33.3  2047.4   8.0  0.5     
Zambia 22.4  69.3  46.9    -39.7  -3.9  1893.1   2.8  0.7  4.0  Rain, floods, drought 
Source:   Calculations based on World Bank, World Development Indicators 2003, CD-Rom (for agriculture value added as share of GDP), and Food and Agriculture Organization, 





Based on the same measures all three sub-groups of the developing-country group also 
have a strong agricultural specialization. The only notable deviation from this picture is 
that the group of LDCs has, on average, less agricultural land than the group of 
developing countries. But the average for the LDC group somewhat distorts the values 
for individual LDCs. A breakdown shows that while there are LDCs where agricultural 
land is scarce, there are numerous LDCs where it is not.5  
In sum, there are 24 countries—including 19 LDCs—with a relatively large share of 
agriculture value added in GDP, a relatively large share of the agriculture population in 
the total population, and a relatively large share of agricultural land in total land. Based 
on these indicators, these countries have a relatively strong specialization in the 
agriculture and appear to have a comparative advantage in agricultural production. 
Thus, it would not be an exaggeration to expect these countries to be, at best, net food 
exporters to the world, or to assume that they are able, at the least, to satisfy the food 
needs of their own population. Yet 23 out of 24 countries (i.e., 96 per cent) that appear 
to have a comparative advantage in agricultural production have received food aid 
during the reference period 1998-2004. By contrast, only 11 out of 36 countries (i.e., 37 
per cent) that appear to be comparatively disadvantaged with regard to agricultural 
production have received food aid over the same period.6 This paper focuses on 
countries which have a potential comparative advantage in agriculture and therefore 
may face competition from other agricultural producers, including those in the advanced 
countries. 
In the group of countries characterized by a relatively strong dependency on food aid 
only 14 out of 23 countries were net food importers. By contrast, in the group of 
countries characterized by a relatively low dependence on food aid 29 out of 34 
countries (for which food trade data were available) were net food importers. This 
suggests that the food insecurity situation of a country cannot systematically be linked 
to its food trade balance. This has important implications as the discussion of food 
insecurity within the multilateral trading system centers around net food-importing 
developing countries rather than food insecure countries as such.  
It appears somewhat paradoxical that the countries which appear to have a comparative 
advantage in agricultural production are the very same countries with the greatest 
exposure to food crises. The situation is particularly pronounced in the least developed 
countries. On average they have a stronger specialization in agriculture than other 
developing countries and yet they receive more food aid than other developing 




                                                 
5  It is important to emphasize however that the indicator of agricultural land does not provide any 
meaningful indication of land quality. The indicator can therefore only be used as a rough proxy for 
the ability to expand agricultural production. 
6   The counries with an apparent disadvantage in the production of agricultural goods have a relatively 
low share of agriculture value added in GDP, a relatively small share of the agriculture population in 
total population and a relatively small share of agriculture land in total land.  
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2.2  Causes of food crises 
Table 1 lists reasons-for food crises, wherever provided by FAO. These ‘causes’ of food 
crises can be broadly grouped into three categories of causes, namely political 
instability, natural disasters and factors that contribute to high dependency ratios. These 
causes for food crises are more pronounced in the least developed countries than in 
other developing countries. 
Political instability 
Political instability, which may or may not result in armed conflict, is one of the most 
cited causes for food crises. Political instability and armed conflict can cause 
displacement of persons, depletion of human capital, destruction of land, decrease of 
economic activities and/or an unequal distribution of economic output. Many of the 
least developed countries are affected by conflict. Between 1992 and 2001 the number 
of LDCs that experienced conflict increased, while the number of other developing 
countries that experienced conflict decreased. In the 1970s and 1980s about 40 per cent 
of the LDCs were affected by conflict, but this figure has increased to 50 per cent in 
1990-95 and to 58 per cent in 1996-2001 (UNCTAD 2004). 
Natural disasters 
The second most cited causes for food insecurity are natural disasters, including 
droughts, floods and storms. Today the LDCs are not only the world’s major centre of 
humanitarian crises; they are also a major locus of natural disasters. While many natural 
disasters can neither exclusively nor directly be attributed to policies of LDCs, natural 
disasters can be exaggerate by practices in LDCs, including a rapid rate of deforestation, 
which is reflected in low levels of genuine domestic savings. Over the past two decades 
the LDCs have seen rapid rate of deforestation. By the late 1990s they had a rate of net 
forest depletion which was equivalent to 2 percent of their GDP; about three times as 
high as in other developing countries (UNCTAD 2002: 91). There are important 
differences between the LDCs however. Those that have been characterized by a 
decrease of poverty have typically seen a lower rate of deforestation and an increase of 
genuine domestic savings, while those that have been characterised by an increase of 
poverty have seen a higher rate of deforestation and a decrease of genuine domestic 
savings.  
High dependency ratios  
Other causes of food insecurity have to do with factors that contribute to high and 
increasing dependency ratios. An increasing number of dependants per income earner 
results from at least four developments, namely higher birth rates, which increase the 
number of children per household; longer life expectancies, which increase the number 
of elders per household; the spread of disease, which worsens the ratio of capable 
income earners to ill persons per household; and political conflict, which has similar 
effects. A net increase of immigration may also contribute to an increase of the 
dependency ratio, especially if immigrants are not allowed to work or are not able to 
find work. Consequently dependency ratios in LDCs are higher than in other developing 
countries; in 2002 they where 0.862 in the LDCs and 0.582 in other developing 
countries. The relatively high dependency ratio implies that a relatively large share of  
7 
the population in the LDCs do not engage in economically productive activities which 
may, in turn, explain why a rather small share of total land in the LDCs is used for 
agriculture.  
The previous section has highlighted two facts: Food crises are particularly frequent in 
the LDCs, and the reasons for food crises are particularly pronounced in the LDCs. 
There thus appears to be a straightforward explanation for food insecurity, which 
suggests similarly straightforward, although not necessarily simple, solutions to food 
insecurity: Countries need to identify the exact cause of food crises and they need to 
take measures to tackle this cause. But frequently it is even more complicated than that. 
Factors which appear to be under the control of food-insecure countries frequently are 
beyond the control of these countries; what may appear to be a cause of a food crisis 
may sometimes be a consequence of a food crisis; and what may appear to be the sole 
cause of food crises may be compounded by other, less obvious causes of food crises.7   
While it is apparent how the outlined factors may contribute to the outbreak of a food 
crisis, they cannot provide a full understanding of the problem. Why, for example, do 
countries continue to specialize in certain agricultural goods even though adverse 
environmental conditions regularly destroy these agricultural goods? Why do these 
countries not diversify into other types of products that would be less vulnerable to 
adverse environmental changes? Why do they not at least change production methods to 
decrease environment-related risks? To answer such questions, the paper proposes a 
methodological distinction between the causes for food crises, which goes beyond the 
distinction that has been made so far.  
The paper proposes a distinction between relatively obvious trigger causes of food 
crises, on the one side, and less obvious systemic causes of food crises, on the other. 
Trigger causes create the short-term changes necessary to actually bring about an 
outbreak of a food crisis. Systemic causes, by contrast, create the long-term conditions 
that are conducive to the outbreak of a food crisis. Unlike the trigger causes, which are 
often of a non-economic nature, systemic causes tend to be of an economic nature. The 
systemic causes have to do with the economic environment that makes it relatively easy 
for countries to slip into food crises, while making it relatively difficult for countries to 
get out of food crises. The paper argues that agricultural support measures of advanced 
countries can act as a systemic cause of food insecurity in the developing countries.  
In order to understand how agricultural support measures of advanced countries can 
negatively affect food security in developing countries, it is important to distinguish 
between a trade-centric perspective and a development-oriented perspective. Unlike the 
development-oriented perspective, the trade-centric perspective suggest that agricultural 
                                                 
7   Poverty and hunger may not only be consequences of conflict, high dependency ratios and natural 
resource depletion; poverty and hunger may also be factors that contribute to conflicts, higher 
dependency ratios and excessive natural resource use. UNCTAD (2002) has highlighted a complex, 
over-determined relationship between poverty, environmental degradation and population growth. 
Furthermore, UNCTAD (2004) has argued that there is not simple, linear relationship between 
conflict and poverty. Most low-income countries have experienced an economic crisis, which deepens 
poverty, before they have experienced the outbreak of conflict, which may further exacerbate poverty 
(see also David 2004). In economic terms: Poor populations tend to have relatively low opportunity 
costs and they may therefore be more prone to get involved in conflict.   
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support measures of advanced countries may actually counteract rather than cause food 
insecurity in developing countries.  
The trade-centric perspective, which is based on trade theory, highlights that the import 
of subsidized foods, like the import of all subsidized products, essentially is a transfer of 
income from the country which subsidizes the good to the country which imports the 
subsidized good. Imports of subsidized food, which ensure low levels of consumer 
prices, can help to discourage an increase of wage rates and thus support the 
international competitiveness of an economy. Furthermore, imports of subsidized food, 
which lead to a contraction of the agricultural sector, may allow for scarce resources to 
be employed in non-agricultural sectors and thus support a more raid structural 
transformation of an economy.  
The development-oriented perspective, by contrast, is less optimistic about the effects of 
subsidized food imports on developing economies and more worried about a premature 
de-agrarianization in these economies. In developing countries, but especially in the 
least developed countries, the development of the agricultural sector is an important 
mean to reduce poverty, as the majority of the poor live in rural areas and as their 
livelihoods directly or indirectly depend on agricultural production. Furthermore, the 
development of the agricultural sector is an essential mean to stimulate other economic 
activities. Dual economy theories highlight many vital linkages between the 
development of the agricultural sector, on the one side, and the development of non-
agricultural sectors on the other (Lewis 1954, 1968; Ranis and Fei 1961; Jorgenson 
1961). Higher agricultural output, for example, will allow countries to save foreign 
exchange by reducing food imports but it may even enable countries to increase foreign 
exchange by rising food exports. Foreign exchange is essential for the poorest countries 
as it enables them to import capital goods which they could not otherwise afford and 
make investments which they could not otherwise conceive as possible.  
Another way in which agricultural support measures of advanced countries can 
undermine the development of developing countries is through their effects on wages in 
the developing countries. Agricultural support measures of advanced countries, similar 
to an unlimited supply of unskilled workers in developing countries, can help to depress 
wages in developing countries. While low wags in developing countries can help to 
increase the competitiveness of these countries in labour-intensive and low-tech sectors, 
it can discourage a specialization of these countries in more capital-intensive and high-
tech sectors. The specialization in labour-intensive rather than capital-intensive, in low-
tech rather than high-tech products has far-reaching implications. It influences current 
production structures, but it also influences future development prospects. This is 
because this pattern of specialization constrains the propensity of economies to increase 
productivity levels and ultimately constrains their ability to enlarge production 
possibilities.  
While the development literature has paid some attention to the ways in which an 
unlimited supply of unskilled labour in developing countries affects the development 
prospects of developing countries (Lewis 1954; Sachs 2000), recent trade studies have 
not paid attention to the way in which agricultural support measures of advanced 
countries affect development prospects of developing countries. These studies have 
largely focused on short-term implications. They have highlighted likely short-term 
effects of an elimination of agricultural support measures, but they have not  
9 
systematically discussed probable long-term effects of an elimination of these support 
measures. While long-term effects are difficult to quantify, they should not be omitted. 
3  Agricultural support measures and food insecurity 
Agricultural support takes two principle forms: it can be provided in the form of 
payments, including producer and consumer subsidies, or in form of border measures, 
including tariff and non-tariff barriers. Tariff barriers are associated with relatively high 
average tariff rates, relatively high tariff peaks, and tariff escalations. By contrast, non-
tariff barriers include import quotas, but also overly complex rules of origin and overly 
stringent sanitary, phytosanitary and technical product standards. As many non-tariff 
barriers are difficult to quantify they are not captured in measures of total aggregate 
support. 
Figure 1 provides an overview of the development of agricultural support in the OECD 
countries. In 2001 OECD countries provided support to their own agricultural sector of 
about US$311 billion. At the same time, the OECD countries provided development 
 
Figure 1 
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General service support estimate
 
Source:  Calculations based on OECD PSE/CSE online database. 
Note:  Consumer support refers to transfers from taxpayers to consumers; all figures are estimates.  
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assistance to all LDCs of only US$12 billion—an amount equivalent to about 
two-weeks’ worth of domestic agricultural support.8 The most important form of 
support is producer support which can be broken down into two types, namely market 
price support, which includes import restrictions, and payments, which include actual 
subsidies paid to producers. Over the years trade liberalization has led to a decrease in 
market price support, resulting in a shift towards direct payments. But despite this shift 
border measures remain the most important mean of agricultural protection in advanced 
countries, and the elimination of these border measures therefore remains the most 
important mean to promote agricultural development in developing countries 
(Hoekman, Ng and Olareaga 2002; Tokarick 2003). 
Whether agricultural support measures of advanced countries affect agricultural 
production in developing countries is theoretically dependent on two conditions, namely 
the size of the economies of advanced countries, and the openness of the economies of 
developing countries. In accordance with real-world conditions it can safely be assumed 
that the advanced countries constitute large economies, which have the potential to 
affect world prices, and that the developing countries are relatively open economies, 
which can be affected by world prices. In accordance with the Trade Restrictiveness 
Index of the International Monetary Fund LDCs have particularly open trade regimes 
(UNCTAD 2004; 2006). 
Agricultural support measures result in major market distortions. Market price support 
delinks product prices, on the one side, and supply and demand, on the other, while 
direct payments to producers decouple produce prices, on the one side, and the income 
of producers, on the other. First-round effects of such distortions can be an excessive 
production of agricultural goods, adding-up problems in agricultural markets and a 
decline of agricultural prices. Reactions to these distortions can bring about second-
round effects, including further downward pressure on product prices, as will be 
highlighted below.  
The Doha Round has given impetus to numerous studies in international trade on 
agricultural support measures. These studies have helped to highlight the ways in which 
and the extent to which agricultural support measures of advanced countries affect 
developing countries. The following section will discuss aspects of these trade-centric 
evaluations of agricultural support measures, while the section after that will describe 
aspects of a more development-oriented evaluation of agricultural support measures. 
3.1  Trade-centric evaluation of agricultural support measures 
How agricultural support measures of advanced countries affect the economies of 
developing countries depends on the comparative advantage of these countries. 
Countries that have neither an actual nor a potential comparative advantage in 
agricultural production are set to benefit. This is because subsidized food imports from 
abroad allow them to reallocate scarce resources from agricultural production, which is 
deemed relatively uncompetitive, to non-agricultural sectors, which are deemed more 
                                                 
8   In 2001 the group of LDCs included 49 countries. Calculations are based on OECD Producer Support 
Estimates/ Consumer Support Estimates and OECD aid data. Development assistance is net 
disbursement of official development assistance, which includes imputed multilateral flows.  
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competitive. By contrast, countries enjoying actual or potential comparative advantage 
in agricultural production would suffer from a premature contraction of their 
agricultural sector.  
When analyzing the effects of agricultural support measures on developing countries, it 
is important to distinguish not only between countries with different comparative 
advantage but to distinguish also between the effects on producers and consumers and 
the effects in the short run and the long run. While producers of agricultural goods may 
suffer from the import of inexpensive foods, the consumers of agricultural goods may 
benefit from the import of inexpensive food. Furthermore, while it is acknowledged that 
the contraction of the agricultural sector may lead to unemployment in the short-term, 
when economies display relatively little flexibility, it is typically assumed that the 
contraction of the agricultural sector does not imply unemployment in the long-term, 
when economies tend move towards equilibrium. Indeed, as was pointed out above, the 
contraction of the agricultural sector may actually support a more rapid expansion of 
non-agricultural sector, as it releases scarce resources that are required for other 
economic activities. 
A realistic evaluation of the effects of agricultural support measures of advanced 
countries would add up the benefits and costs that developing countries have incurred 
over the past years because of these support measres. Yet, instead evaluations of the 
effects of agricultural support measures of advanced countries focus on the benefits and 
cost that developing countries are expected to incur in the next years if these support 
measures were to be eliminated today. It is important to emphasize that past benefits and 
costs are very different from future potential benefits and costs. It would therefore be 
misguided to use the latter as a proxy for the former. In other words, even if the benefits 
of eliminating agricultural support today may appear very small, it would be a hasty to 
conclude that the costs of maintaining agricultural support over the past years were very 
small as well.  
Hypothetically there are three effects that agricultural support measures of advanced 
countries may have on agricultural production in developing countries:  
—  No effects. This is because advanced countries produce and support temperate 
agricultural products, whereas most developing countries specialize in tropical 
agricultural products.  
—  Negative net effects. This is because the elimination of agricultural support in 
advanced countries will lead to an increase of the food import bill of developing 
countries. The negative effect associated with an increased food import bill of 
developing countries is expected to exceed the positive effect associated with 
increased agricultural production in developing countries.   
—  Positive effect. This is because the elimination of agricultural support in advanced 
countries will lead to an increase of agricultural production in developing 
countries. The positive effect associated with an increased production of 
agricultural goods in developing countries is expected to exceed the negative effect 
associated with an increased food import bill of developing countries. 
While the first hypothetical effects assumes that there are no links between agricultural 
support in advanced countries and agricultural production in developing countries, the  
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second and third hypothetical effect suggest links between these two factors, although 
with inverse signs. 
Table 2 shows that the first hypothetical effect is inconsistent with empirical data. The 
table provides an overview of the products which receive support in OECD countries 
and the five most important producers of these products and their substitutes in the 
LDCs. From this it becomes apparent that LDCs produce virtually all the goods 
supported by OECD countries. Furthermore, the LDCs produce many goods that are 
substitutes for the goods supported by OECD countries.9 
It can therefore be concluded that agricultural support measures of advanced countries 
affect agricultural production in developing countries. The case of cotton provides a 
particularly dramatic illustration of how agricultural subsidies of advanced countries can 
impede agricultural development in the developing countries (Badiane et al. 2002; 
Oxfam 2003). But can the case of cotton be generalized?  
Estimates of the benefits that developing countries may derive from the elimination of 
support measures in advanced countries are dependent on the level of support. As past 
efforts to liberalize multilateral trade have made more progress as regards industrial 
goods than agricultural goods it can be expected that future efforts to liberalize 
multilateral trade will bring about more benefits when they now focus on the 
agricultural sector rather than the industrial sector. Furthermore, as agricultural support 
measures are largely border measures, it can be expected that the reduction of trade 
barriers will bring about higher benefits than the elimination of subsidies. Studies 
confirm these projections (e.g., Hoekman, Ng and Olareaga 2002).  
Similarities between simulation exercises can be attributed to the fact that almost all use 
the same general equilibrium model, albeit different versions (UNCTAD 2003b); the 
differences between the simulation exercises can be attributed to varying assumptions 
about elasticities (Anderson et al. 2000; Diao, Roe and Somwaru. 2001; World Bank 
2003). Different studies assume different supply responses to multilateral trade 
liberalization and different poverty reduction responses to economic growth.  
The simulation exercises show that gains from trade liberalization are not evenly 
distributed amongst countries. While there is broad consensus that the largest and most 
advanced agricultural producers amongst the developing countries, namely the Cairns 
Group, would benefit from the elimination of agricultural support, there is no agreement 
whether the smaller and less-developed agricultural producers, namely the LDCs, would 
benefit from the elimination of agricultural support measures (Hoekman, Ng and 
Olareaga 2002; Peters 2006). The uncertain benefits of the LDCs are related to the 
assumption that the LDCs have a weak supply response to trade liberalization. This 
certainly is an appropriate assumption for the short run, but it does not need to hold true 
in the long run. 
  
                                                 
9   While this distinction between temperate and tropical goods has always been difficult, it becomes 
increasingly blurred, as progress in technology, including biotechnology, allows for an increasing 
number of goods to be produced in diverse climatic zones.   
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Table 2 Products supported by OECD countries, and the top-five producers of these productsa, based on average annual production in metric tons, 1991-2000 
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Source: Calculations based on OECD PSE/ CSE on-line data on agricultural subsidies and FAO on-line 
data on agricultural production. 
Notes:  
a  The table includes all goods that receive support from OECD countries, regardless of the type 
and the level. The largest LDC producer for each product is identified by the number ‘1’, ... the 
fifth largest LDC producer for each product is identified by the number ‘5’. In the case of 
strawberries no significant LDCs producers has been identified; in the case of oats and 
rapeseeds there are only two LDC producers; in the case of spinach there are only three LDC 
producers; and in the case of pears there are only four LDC producers. For all other products 
there are at least five LDC producers. No substitutes have been identified for eggs, coffee and 
tobacco.  
b  ‘Equivalents’ are products included in the FAO database on agricultural production that can be 
directly compared with the products that are subsidized by OECD countries, whereas 
‘substitutes’ are products included in FAO database on agricultural production that have similar 
properties to those products that are supported by OECD countries. While the category of 
‘equivalents’ includes only goods in their unprocessed form, the category of ‘substitutes’ includes 
goods in both their unprocessed and processed forms. For a detailed description of the 
methodology, see Herrmann (2003a). 
c  Amongst the OECD countries only Mexico provides support for coffee; support is provided in 
form of consumer support. 
 
The models can provide important insights into the ways in which trade liberalization 
affects economies and people, but they cannot provide very accurate estimates of the 
effects of trade liberalization on economies or people. This is because the models 
neglect many important variables. These variables include, for example, non-tariff 
barriers to trade. Overly complex rules of origin or overly stringent sanitary, 
phytosanitary and technical product standards can result in an actual supply response 
that is significantly lower than the projected supply response. Indeed non-tariff barriers 
to trade are a particularly great impediment to trade for many of the poorest countries. 
In 1999-2001 environment-related trade barriers affected 42 per cent of the LDC 
experts. For comparison, in the same period tariff barriers affected only 24 per cent of 
LDC exports. Other developing countries have the inverse problem. In the same period 
about 38 per cent of their exports were negatively affected by tariff barriers but only 20 
per cent of their exports were negatively affected by environment-related barriers to 
trade.10  
There are important reasons why the benefits of agricultural trade liberalization for 
developing countries, especially the LDCs, may be overestimated. But there are also 
important reasons why the benefits of agricultural trade liberalization for developing 
countries, including the LDCs, are underestimated:  
—  Simulation exercises focus on benefits that developing countries may have if 
advanced countries where to face out agricultural support; they do not take 
account of the foregone benefits that developing countries would have had if 
advanced countries had not provided agricultural support in the first place. If 
advanced countries would not have provided agricultural support, developing 
countries would have benefited from higher agricultural prices which could have 
encouraged an expansion of agricultural production and significantly higher 
returns to agricultural production.  
                                                 
10    Environment-related trade barriers include sanitary, phytosanitary and technical product standards 
(Fontagné, von Kirchbach and Mimouni 2001; Herrmann 2003b).  
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—  The starting position of any simulation is the current pattern of agricultural 
production and trade (which is itself the result of distorting agricultural policies) 
rather than past or potential patterns (which would be a better reflection of the 
country’s underlying comparative advantage). While past performance is not a 
reliable indicator of future potential, it is nonetheless important to recall the fact 
that the LDC group was actually a net food exporter until 1988.11 According to 
Cline (2004) many LDCs still have a latent comparative advantage in production 
of food even though many of them are currently net importers of food.  
—  Simulation exercises also underestimate the benefits of agricultural support 
measures by concentrating only on products that receive agricultural support. This 
makes the simulations too limited, as support measures not only distort the 
markets of subsidized products, but also markets of substitute goods (Herrmann 
2003a). 
—  Simulation exercises disregard the strategic importance of agricultural 
development for overall economic development, as suggested by structuralist 
dual-economy models of development (Lewis 1954, 1968; Ranis and Fei 1961; 
Jorgenson 1961). 
—  Simulation exercises disregard the importance of agricultural development for 
poverty reduction, which stems from the fact that the majority of the poor directly 
or indirectly derive their incomes from agricultural production (Cline 2004). 
In sum, there are good reasons to assume that the economic effects of multilateral trade 
liberalization are overestimated, but there are equally good reasons to assume that they 
are underestimated. Whatever the projection, considerable deviations of actual from 
estimated effects are likely, and these deviations are prone to be largest in the least 
developed countries. On the one side there are many factors that negative affect exports 
of LDCs (e.g., non-tariff barriers to trade affect), but on the other side there are reasons 
to believe that many LDCs can significantly increase their agricultural production (e.g., 
favourable natural resource endowments). Overall it would appear that the LDCs can 
derive considerable gains from multilateral trade liberalization, especially in the area of 
agriculture, provided that: 
—  Countries eliminate all unnecessary non-tariff barriers to trade (overly complex 
rules of origin, overly stringent sanitary, phytosanitary and technical product 
standards, etc.);  
—  The international donor community effectively helps the LDCs to comply with 
the remaining trade barriers (reasonable product standards, various trade rules, 
etc.); and 
—  The international community effectively helps the LDCs to strengthen their 
productive capacities (infrastructure, finance, technology, skills, etc.). The Aid-
for-Trade initiative is an important step in this direction, but the current focus of 
this initiative is too limited. While it is important to help countries comply with 
trade rules and product standards, it is equally important to help them establish 
and maintain physical infrastructure, functioning financial institutions and 
appropriate business-support institutions. 
                                                 
11  Calculations based on UN Comtrade data.  
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This combination of measures can be expected to assist the LDCs to endeavour to 
achieve high and sustainable economic growth rates; a condition indispensable for 
sustainable poverty alleviation and, inter alia, and the elimination of hunger.  
3.2. Development-oriented evaluation of agricultural support measures 
Figure 2 presents a stylized picture of the ways in which agricultural support by 
advanced countries affects agricultural production in developing countries. In 
correspondence with actual patterns of agricultural production the figure assumes that 
developing countries produce tropical agricultural goods, which are not produced by 
advanced countries, and that they also produce temperate agricultural goods, which are 
also produced by advanced countries. For simplicity the flow diagram focuses does not 
include additional products, given that the inclusion of additional products would not 
change the basic message. The flow diagram examines possible responses of advanced 
developing countries, on the one side, and the least developed countries, on the other, to 
agricultural support measures of advanced countries. 
Agricultural support measures of advanced countries lead to lower prices of agricultural 
goods at both the international level and farm gates. The lower prices of the shared 
agricultural good leave developing countries with two principle alternatives: They may 
decide to continue the production of the shared agricultural good, in which case they 
need to decrease the price of their produce, or they can decide to stop the production of 
the shared agricultural good, in which case they need to diversify into other goods. 
If the developing countries continue with the production of the shared agricultural good, 
they need to lower the relative prices of these goods. This can be achieved through an 
increased level of productivity and/or a decreased level of production costs.12 While any 
country can hardly increase productivity levels in the short run, more advanced countries 
may be able to increase productivity levels in the medium to long run. This is also true for 
the more advanced countries amongst the developing countries. Thus while advanced 
developing countries may have the possibility to increase productivity levels and pursue 
the ‘high road’ to competitiveness, least developed countries are most likely forced to cut 
costs and take the ‘low road’ to competitiveness. Given that labour is the most intensively 
used factor of production in the majority of lesser developed countries, this means 
downward pressure on wage rates and/or payroll fringe costs. The question is how 
realistic this would be in countries where the wages are already at subsistence levels. 
Whether developing countries achieve their competitiveness from higher productivity or 
lower wage levels, the unit value of agricultural products will fall and, all else equal, the 
return to agricultural producers will fall as well. In order to make up for a lower unit 
value of goods, producers are likely to increase the sales volume of the goods. While 
this is a perfectly rational reaction at the level of the individual, it can have undesired 
effects at the level of the community. This is because a simultaneous increase of 
                                                 
12  Assuming a Ricardian-type formula, where the comparative advantage of countries, expressed by the 
prices of its products (P), is determined by the relationship between wages (w) and labour productivity 
(Y) (i.e., P=w/Y). In a model with multiple factors of production wage costs would be replaced by 
aggregate production costs.  
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agricultural production is likely to lead to a fallacy of composition which puts further 
downward pressure on agricultural prices (second-round effects on prices). 
 
Figure 2 
Links between agricultural support measures of advanced countries 
 and production decisions in developing countries 
Developing countries/ open 
economies that continue to 
produce temperate agricultural 
goods 








levels in order 
to compete
Farm gate prices of temperate 
agricultural goods experience 
downward pressure
Developing countries/ open 
economies that stop producing 
temperate agricultural goods 
Increase output of temperate 
agricultural goods to 
compensate for decline of 
unit values. 
Increase output of diverse 
range of goods to 
compensate for revenues 
loss from temperate 
agricultural goods
Increase output of narrow range 
of tropical agricultural goods in 
order to compensate for 





Downward pressure on 
prices of temperate 
goods, vicious cycle
Downward pressure 
on prices of tropical 
goods, vicious cycle
Price effect depends 
on size of producers
Likely responses of advanced 
developing countries








But will the developing countries fare better if they decide to stop rather than continue 
the production of temperate agricultural goods? The answer to this question depends on 
a country's productive capacities which determine its production possibilities. Relatively 
advanced developing countries which have relatively strong productive capacities and 
extended production possibilities may be able to diversify in a broad range of other 
products. Indeed countries that have this option should probably make use of it. This 
way they can enjoy the benefit of importing goods at prices below normal price levels, 
and they can increase their aggregate output by focusing on products for which they can 
get normal returns. 
The situation is different for the LDCs as the LDCs typically have very weak productive 
capacities. The weak productive capacities prevent them from diversifying into new 
types of agricultural and non-agricultural products. As a consequence they are 
encouraged to specialize in a narrow range of products in which they are almost 
exclusive producers. Goods which are produced almost exclusively by the poorest 
countries, and are therefore rarely supported by advanced countries, are tropical goods. 
A notable exception is cotton. But while an increasing specialization in tropical goods 
may seem to make economic sense, it is associated with considerable economic 
difficulties. Many of the tropical produce are characterized by unstable prices, and many 
economies that have a strong specialization in these produce are therefore prone to 
suffer from unstable export revenues and economic shocks. These problems are 
exaggerated by the fact that an increased production of tropical goods, like an increased 
production of any common good, is likely to lead to a further deterioration of prices. 
Confronted by falling revenues producers of tropical agricultural goods may decide to 
further increase the production of tropical agricultural goods and subsequently 
contribute to further price deteriorations. 
The fallacy of composition and falling prices of commodities continue to be important 
problems for many of the poorest countries, as many these countries heavily depend on 
primary commodity exports. Table 3 shows that commodity price changes over the 
period 1980-2001 have serious effects on the LDCs’ export revenues. The decline of 







                                                 
13  It is important to emphasize that this is an analysis of long-term trends in commodity prices and that it 
does not take account of recent changes in commodity prices, especially where metals, minerals, ores 
and oil are concerned. The increase of these prices, which will benefit many African countries that are 
rich in natural resources, has been encouraged by an increase of demand, which is due mainly to 
China and India’s expansion of manufactured production (see also UNCTAD 2003a, 2005; Mayer and 
Fajarnes 2005).  
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Table 3 Estimated effect of international commodity price changes since 1980 on the export revenues of 
the LDCs, 2001 
  
International commodity 
prices, 1980-2001    LDCs export values, 2001 
   1991  2001  1980-2001    Actual Potential Loss/gain
 Product  code 
(SITC 3 Rev. 2) Index, 1980=100 Change, %    US$ million 
All foods  0,1,22,4 59  51  -49    4166  6191  -2025 
Beverages              
Cocoa & products  072-073  47  45  -55    28  43  -15 
Coffee & substitutes  071  44  30  -70    444  755  -312 
Tea & mate  074  92  120  20    142  114  28 
Foods              
Bananas & other fruits  057  151  156  56    186  82  104 
Beef & other meats  011-012,014  96  77  -23    37  46  -9 
Fish 034-037  95  96  -4    1562  1617  -55 
Maize 044  86  79  -21    32  39  -7 
Pepper & other vegetables  054  69  119  19    239  192  47 
Rice 042  72  40  -60    37  59  -22 
Sugar & products  061-062  31  30  -70    229  388  -160 
Wheat 041,046  59  64  -36    23  32  -8 
Vegetable oil seeds & oils                 
Oilseeds, incl. soybeans  222-223  77  66  -34    236  315  -80 
Oils, incl. linseed oil  423-424  68  57  -43    96  138  -42 
Agricultural raw materials  21,23-26,29 97  76  -24    2177  2702  -525 
Textiles              
Cotton, raw  263  85  54  -46    831  1217  -386 
Cotton, manufd  652  85  54  -46    97  142  -45 
Jute 264  110  105  5    59  56  3 
Sisal & other textiles  651,659  88  99  -1    301  305  -4 
Wool 268  118  75  -25    3  3  -1 
Wood              
Wood,  rough  245-248  123  128  28    863 620 243 
Plywood & other manufd woods  634-635  136  150  50    75  38  37 
Others              
Cattle hides & other hides, manufd  211  111  127  27    378  276  102 
Cattle hides & other hides, raw  611-612  111  127  27    126  92  34 
Rubber, raw  232-233  75  42  -58    36  57  -21 
Rubber, manufd  621,625,628  75  42  -58    10  16  -6 
Tobacco  121-122  154  131  31    377 259 118 
Minerals, ores & metals  27-28,68 95  78  -22    2085  2546  -461 
Minerals              
Phosphate rock & other minerals  271  99  97  -3    61  62  -2 
Ore              
Ores raw (incl. iron, mang., tungst.)  28-282, 287  135  91  -9    697  760  -63 




135 91  -9    274  299 -25 
Metals              
Aluminium 684  75  84  -16    388  452  -64 
Copper 682  114  83  -17    602  705  -103 
Lead  685  72  79  -21    0 0 0 
Nickel  683  124  90  -10    0 0 0 
Tin  687  36  33  -67    0 0 0 
Zinc  686  144  117  17    0 0 0 
Precious  metals              
Gold 971  59  44  -56    811  1263  -452 
Silver 681  20  21  -79    2  4  -2 
Gold, silver ware, etc.  897  39  33  -67    7  12  -5 
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Source: Calculations based on UN Comtrade database and UNCTAD Commodity Price Bulletin. 
Notes: 
a)   The estimates focus on the year 2001, the latest year for which export data were available at the 
time of calculation.  
b)    International prices for individual products are provided by the UNCTAD Commodity Price 
Bulletin; export values for individual products are provided by the UN Comtrade database.  
 
The decline of agricultural product prices—which is partially attributable to agricultural 
support measures of advanced countries—depress agricultural development in 
developing countries. This is because low prices of agricultural goods encourage 
developing countries to stop the production of agricultural goods and to import these 
goods, even though the very same countries would normally have a comparative 
advantage in agricultural goods and would normally be exporting these goods. Case 
study evidence shows that subsidized food exports of advanced countries have led to 
surges of food imports by many poor countries (FAO 2003). Furthermore, case study 
evidence shows that subsidized food exports of advanced countries caused the demise of 
food industries in poor countries (UNCTAD 2002: 108). While this is not the only 
reasons why LDCs have become net food importers, it is certainly a factor that can help 
explain why LDCs have become less successful food exporters.  
The poorest developing countries, which have few economic activities outside the 
agricultural sector, are particularly affected by these developments. As their agricultural 
production contracts, these countries are encouraged to spend scarce foreign exchange 
on the import of basic consumer goods that they should be able to produce at home. As 
a consequence they have insufficient financial resources to spend on the import of 
capital goods, which they cannot produce domestically. 
Figure 3 shows that in comparison with other, more advanced developing countries, the 
LDCs spend now a large proportion of their foreign exchange on the import of basic 
consumption goods (i.e., good which ensure human survival) rather than the import of 
capital goods (i.e., goods which enable investment). 
While it is typically acknowledged that agricultural support measures of advanced 
countries have negative effects on producers in developing countries it is frequently 
argued that agricultural subsidies of advanced countries have positive effects on 
consumers in developing countries, as they effectively decrease consumer prices and 
thereby increase real incomes. This logic is correct, but it does not support the 
conclusion that imports of subsidized foods by developing countries help to combat 
poverty and hunger in developing countries, or the inverse conclusion that the 
elimination of agricultural subsidies in advanced countries will worsen poverty and 
hunger in developing countries. Whether agricultural subsidies of advanced countries 
help or hurt the poor in developing countries depends on whether the costs associated 
with the contraction of agricultural production outweigh the benefits associated with 
lower prices of imported foods. Overall it seems that the net effects on the poor are 
likely to be negative. This is because the majority of the poor directly or indirectly 
derive their livelihood from agricultural production. A contraction of agricultural 
production is therefore likely to negatively affect their income (cash or in kind). At the 
same time the majority of the poor have a very low consumption of imported goods. An 
expansion of subsidized food imports is therefore unlikely to significantly raise their 
real income (see also Paarlberg 1999).  
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Figure 3 
The structure of merchandise imports of the LDCs and other developing countries, 1999-2001 
 
Source: Calculations based on UN Comtrade database. 
Note:  
a)    Commodity definitions in accordance with SITC Rev. 2: Office and telecommunications 
machinery: code 75 and 76; industrial machinery: code 71+72+73+74+77-775; all machinery:  
7-775-781+87+881+884 (includes all previous). Medicine: code 541; basic foodstuffs: code: 
00+01+02+04+054+056+09+22+4; all foods: 0+1+22+4 (includes all previous).  
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In conclusion, agricultural support measures of advanced countries cause major market 
distortions which discourage agricultural production in developing countries. A weak 
development of agricultural sector can also slow the development of non-agricultural 
sectors. As a result many people will be confronted by unemployment or 
underemployment, and they will suffer from poverty and hunger. The elimination of 
agricultural support measures by advanced countries is thus an important precondition 
for the economic development of developing countries and ultimately and important 
mean to combat poverty and promote food security.  
In principle advanced countries should change their agricultural policies in order to 
eliminate dangerous market distortions. But in practice advanced countries have very 
little incentives to undertake such adjustments. This is because advanced countries do 
get benefits from providing agricultural support and they do not bear the full costs of 
these policies. The costs that they bear are mainly associated with higher food prices for 
consumers in the advanced countries; the costs that they effectively externalize are 
associated with a lower production in the developing countries. If advanced countries 
were to internalize the full cost of their policies, they may be more likely to consider a 
change of these policies. A way to encourage such an internalization of costs by 
advanced countries may be the introduction of targeted trade barriers in other countries 
which essentially prevent subsidized food exports. Safeguard measures of developing 
countries appear justifiable and in line with multilateral trade rules, given that it should 
not prove too difficult to explain why and how agricultural support measures of 
advanced countries threaten agricultural industries in developing countries. 
4 Policy  implications 
At its core food insecurity has to do with economic underdevelopment of countries. In 
other words, countries are food insecure either because they do not have the capacity to 
produce sufficient food at home or because they do not have the foreign exchange to 
import necessary food from abroad.  
While this paper acknowledges that trigger causes can lead to food insecurity, the paper 
focuses on systemic causes of food insecurity, which are often neglected in the 
discussion of food insecurity but are no less important for a comprehensive 
understanding of food insecurity. While there are many potential systemic causes for 
food insecurity the paper focuses on only one systemic cause of food insecurity, namely 
agricultural support measures of advanced countries. Agricultural support measures of 
advanced countries are a systemic cause for food insecurity as they have a negative 
effect on the development of the agricultural sector. As a consequence, they also have 
negative effects on the development of other, non-agricultural sectors. Agricultural 
support measures of advanced countries may thus be said to contribute to economic 
underdevelopment of developing countries, which is at the core of food insecurity. 
One key implication of this is that food security in developing countries is best achieved 
through their economic development; another key implication is that agricultural 
support measures of advanced countries need to be eliminated as they impede this 
economic development.  
  23
The WTO Agreement on Agriculture has the ambitious aim of applying the same rules 
to agricultural trade as for non-agricultural trade, and the Doha Agenda used to have the 
ambitious aim to encourage significant liberalization of the agricultural sector. These 
objectives are well taken, but actual reforms fall far short of required reforms. What is 
needed is a comprehensive approach to phase-out support measures in advanced 
countries, which is based on economic rather than political rational. In accordance all 
support measures that alter the relative price of production factors should be considered 
trade-distorting, as they change the comparative advantage of a country and ultimately 
trade flows. But a comprehensive approach in the area of trade needs to be 
complemented by a comprehensive approach in the area of aid. 
In short, the objective to combat hunger in developing countries raises a series of 
important implications for policy makers: 
—  ‘Solving hunger isn’t about providing food, except for acute cases. It’s about 
solving poverty. The Doha Round, and making trade a more viable option for 
developing countries and poor people, can help reduce poverty’ (Kripke quoted in 
Reuters 2005). In order for poor developing countries to sustainably combat food 
insecurity it is necessary that the developing countries promote economic 
development. While economic development is about more than high and sustained 
rates of economic growth, economic development must be accompanied by high 
and sustained rates of economic growth, especially in the poorest developing 
countries. In such countries, high and sustained rates of economic growth are 
essential for the creation of productive employment opportunities, an increase of 
household incomes and ultimately a reduction of poverty (UNCTAD 2002, 2004, 
2006). 
—  For poor countries to promote economic growth, they have to have strong 
productive capacities. Given the importance of productive capacities the 
development of productive capacities should be a core objective of developing 
countries and a core objective of their development partners. In accordance, 
development partners should significantly increase aid for productive sectors, 
which implies a reversal of current trends in aid flows. 
—  In order to support the economic development of developing countries donors 
should adjust aid policies but they also need to change trade policies in order to 
ensure coherence between the two. It is not only important that more aid is spent 
on the development of productive sectors in developing countries, but it is also 
necessary that trade policies do not undermine the development of the productive 
sector in the developing countries. Advanced countries should therefore eliminate 
agricultural support policies. 
—  It is important that countries do not refrain from phasing out agricultural support 
because of possible adjustment costs. It is better to address adjustment costs, such 
as an increase of the food import bill, than to maintain market-distorting policies. 
Aid to help countries cope with adjustment costs should be provided to countries 
that are most in need (i.e., the low-income countries) and it should be provided in a 
non-debt creating form (i.e., grants). Developing countries have made only little 
use of existing instruments to finance food imports during balance-of-payments 
crisis. This is not necessarily an indication that developing countries are not willing 
to use such funds, it is rather an indication that the funds are not provided at  
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attractive conditions (i.e., loans rather than grants and in conjunction with 
conditionalities).  
—  Aid should be provided in ways that prevent the accumulation of unsustainable 
external debt. While aid which is used to finance commercial activities that are 
expected to generate a future stream of income may be provided in form of loans, 
aid that is used for activities that cannot be expected to generate a future stream of 
income should always be provided in form of grants. This means, for example, that 
aid which is used to finance consumption goods (e.g., food imports) or aid that is 
used to finance public goods (e.g., health, education, research, certain types of 
infrastructure) should be provided in form of grants. Otherwise recipient countries 
may soon confront another debt crisis. 
—  Short-term measures to deal with food crises in developing economies should not 
impinge on long-term strategies for developing productive sectors in these 
countries. This means, for example, that food aid should be provided in a manner 
that minimizes market distortions. 
Similar to agricultural support measures of advanced countries, food aid of advanced 
countries, may negatively affect the long-term development of developing countries. On 
the one side, recipient countries, which have an actual or potential comparative 
advantage in agricultural production, may be discouraged from developing their 
agricultural production as long as subsidized food imports or food aid offer access to 
inexpensive foods. On the other side, donor countries, providing support to their 
agricultural production, may wish to continue this support as long as increased food 
exports and food aid provide them with the opportunity to dispose of surplus food (von 
Braun 2003). Marianne Fischer Boel, EU Farm Commissioner, said that ‘genuine food 
aid is both desirable and legal […] [but] we have focused on the problem of using food 
aid as a way to get rid of surplus production’ (quoted in Reuters 2005). 
In order to improve the delivery of food aid in a way that it does not discourage the 
development of agricultural sectors, it is important that donors have a better 
understanding of why developing countries require food aid and why they fail to 
produce sufficient food domestically. So far much emphasis has been given to the food 
trade balance of countries but the food trade balance provides no information about the 
probability of food crises or about the potential of food production. It therefore appears 
desirable to evaluate not only whether countries are net importers of food, but to also 
whether determine whether countries can import or produce food on a sustainable basis. 
A series of backward and forward looking questions may help to better evaluate current 
and future prospects of food security. Figure 4 lists such questions. It is important to 
emphasize that these questions are merely indicative and that the list is not exhaustive.14 
On the basis of these or similar questions it may be possible to gain a more refined 
understanding of which countries are prone to suffer from food crises and which are less 
likely to be affected. In addition, the questions indicate whether countries have a 
capacity to produce food domestically or whether they do not. Such information is 
useful for the design of food aid policies, but it can also provide clues about the 
potential of agricultural development. 
                                                 
14  A final country classification would, of course, also depend on the specific thresholds that are set for 
the different indicators. For possible criteria and thresholds, see note to Figure 4. FAO (2002) has also 
examined possibilities to refine the classification of countries that are in need of food aid.  
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Figure 4 
 Scheme for identification of countries that face risk of food insecurity and countries that require particular 
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